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ABSTRACT
In this short piece, I return to the articles in this special issue to examine
the relationship between the material reality of the concept of BRICs and its
symbolic place in the world economy today. Aside from the facts that the
BRIC countries have been ready to depart from the Washington consensus
on certain key elements (state intervention), while maintaining other aspects
(fiscal discipline), there isn’t much support for the notion that these countries
somehow share specific development strategies. If anything, the papers in
this special issue show that these four countries have rather different eti-
ologies of growth. The notion of BRICs, I argue, is thus better apprehended
through its symbolic and political dimensions, as an effort by well-placed
actors in the financial markets to drum up excitement about investment
opportunities, as well as reorient the governance structures of the world
economy away from the traditional stronghold of Europe.
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was set up in 1944 as a lender
to countries facing temporary payment imbalances and with no easy ac-
cess to financial markets. Over its nearly 70 years of existence, the IMF’s
function has evolved from a temporary credit facility to a full-blown eco-
nomicmanager, deeply implicated in countries’ domestic governance. The
reason, as Babb (2013) points out in her piece in this volume, is the rise
of conditionality in lending, prompted by the massive expansion of the
IMF’s role (from 29 member-states in 1945 to 188 today), the vulnera-
bility of countries to increasingly volatile capital markets after 1971, the
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assertiveness of experts steeped inmodern economics, and the natural ten-
dency of bureaucratic institutions to expand their realm of action through
‘mission creep’ (Babb and Buira, 2005). And, thus, the IMF became better
known for its stern demands for macroeconomic austerity and for ag-
gressively pushing market-oriented structural reforms than for its ‘help-
ing hand’. The organization became an ideological pillar of the so-called
‘Washington consensus’ and one of itsmost powerful channels of diffusion
worldwide.
One of the purposes of this RIPE symposium has been to assess what
has become of the set of policy prescriptions that, in the 1990s, seemed
to reign supreme among the IMF and its Washington acolytes – the so-
called ‘Washington consensus’.1 This is a good time to take stock. For one
thing, some of the prominent historical targets of these prescriptions (in
this volume, Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Russia and India) have broken
free from the IMF and from conditional lending – and done well without
it. Second, countries that were historically marginal to Washington Con-
sensus influence have leapt to the fore of the global economy: China is
now second only to the United States in nominal GDP. As this volume
patently demonstrates, the mixed economy strategies of all four BRICs
(Brazil, Russia, India and China), which is at odds with many standard
Washington Consensus prescriptions, has largely paid off over the last
decade – even though the sustainability of such high levels of growth over
the long run remains in question (remember that the 1997 Asian crisis
was preceded by considerable enthusiasm about Asia’s new development
model). Third, refracting the new dynamics in the world economy today
is the dramatic shift in the location of large-scale economic disasters –and
the Fund’s client base – from the middle-income periphery to advanced
Western economies. In fact, one common feature of the BRICs is that they
have weathered the blow-ups in the United States and the Eurozone rea-
sonably well (so far). This common pattern of resilience has legitimated
a posteriori the conceptual coherence of the BRICs concept and has been
a reason for its success. But it also offers an opportunity to reflect upon
where the concept comes from, what it stands in relation to, and what
it does. In the first part of this short piece, I look at whether the recent
reality of economic governance in the BRICs, as described in this issue
of Review of International Political Economy (RIPE), fits into the conceptual
framework of the Washington Consensus. If anything, these empirical as-
sessments show that the relationship between the two is quite distant, and
that each country in the BRIC group offers a very distinctive alternative.
In the second part, I move the debate from the material to the symbolic
construction of the BRICs and briefly examine how the uniting of such
unlikely economic bedfellows under the BRIC label could take root, and
what this kind of unitingmeans in relation to the on-goingmarch of global
capitalism.
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1. THE MATERIAL: HOW ECONOMIC REALITIES FIT
(OR DO NOT FIT) INTO WORDS
The Washington Consensus became good to think of as a ‘transnational
paradigm’ (Babb, 2013) because of the centrality of the IMF and a few other
international institutions to the financing and governance of the world’s
domestic economies. Specifically, the number of countries under one or the
other IMF programme in a given year grew sharply after the 1973 oil shock
‘from 21 in 1974 to 56 in 1983. [In 2000,] 182members [were] eligible to take
out loans’ (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000: 288). Furthermore, a subset of
nations was characterized by prolonged use, never really getting off the
IMF’s ‘helping hand’. The IMF’s influence was thus not only extensive,
reaching into every corner of the globe, itwas intensive aswell, penetrating
deep into countries’ policy machines and often poisoning their politics.
Then, in the mid-2000s, this large clientele seemed to evaporate. With
the Latin American debt crisis, the Asian and Russian crises in hindsight,
the middle-income countries that traditionally formed the IMF’s client
base had grown weary of this increasingly intransigent and demanding
lender. Shying away from the IMF’s conditional loans and its assorted pol-
icy prescriptions, countries turned to their reserves and bilateral credit to
rid themselves of financial and political dependency on the institution, as
Babb (2013) reminds us. In some cases, the relationship fell apart spectac-
ularly, with populations galvanized against austerity (Auyero, 2001) and
governments now playing hardball to obtain favourable renegotiations
of their debt. Buoyed by high soy prices, Argentina paid back a $9.8 bil-
lion loan early in 2006, effectively severing 22 years of close ties with the
IMF. Around the same time, Brazil repaid a $15.5 billion loan ahead of
schedule after six years of successive IMF programmes. A booming Russia
soon followed suit (Rutland, 2013). In fact, strengthened by an ebullient
world economy and with a new awareness of fiscal discipline, all middle-
income countries with outstanding loans exited IMF programmes in rapid
succession during 2006–07 (with the exception of crisis-ridden Turkey).
Sometimes this meant short-term fiscal pain, but it seemedworth the gain,
both politically and economically. The result is that by 2007, the level of
IMF credit outstanding had plunged to a historic low, falling to levels not
seen since before the Mexican debt crisis of 1982 (Figure 1). Facing tight
budgetary constraints, the IMF was forced to sell off some of its gold and
invest the proceeds to support its $1 billion operating costs (T. Jones, 2012).
For thefirst time, the staff had to seriously cut downonexpenses andperks.
Now required to swallow its own austerity medicine, looking irrelevant in
aworld that had ceased to need itsmoney, the IMFwas repeatedly derided
in the press. Those were lean and demoralizing years.
In 2008, however, theworldmiraculously reversed itself. The traditional
borrowers had stopped borrowing, but new and unexpected borrowers
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Figure 1 Total IMF credit outstanding for all members, 1984–2013 (in billions of
special drawing rights). Source: International Monetary Fund.
came along, swept by the US financial crisis and the Eurozone sovereign
debt crisis. Lending grew rapidly again. By 2013, Ireland, Portugal and
Greece were all under an IMF programme, and Spain was on track for the
same. At the time of writing, Spanish leaders are struggling to avoid this
fate, troubled as they are by themoral stigma and fiscal sacrifices tradition-
ally associated with IMF interventions. The irony is that these dilemmas
are taking place right at the time when the IMF, in a rare moment of reflex-
ivity, has publicly expressed strong reservations about the suitability of
excessive austerity packages in crisis situations (IMF, 2012; Blanchard and
Leigh, 2013). Or, perhaps, the IMF’s turnabout, which signals – more than
anything else – the end of the Washington Consensus as we knew it, must
be understood in the light of this new fact: the institution is less comfort-
able strictly disciplining European countries than it has been correcting
the flaws of the rest of the world.2 After all, the IMF was, in large part,
a European creation. Its managing director has always been a European3
and much of its staff is trained in Europe or in the US. Europe’s austerity
debacle thus struck closer to home and accelerated the institution’s process
of soul-searching and self-critique. Unsurprisingly, this double standard
has irked policy makers in emerging market economies, who ‘see the
259
FOURCADE: MATERIAL AND SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF THE BRICS
exceptional amount of financing provided to eurozone economies like
Greece, recent calls to ease up on austerity, and the leniency in dealing
with missed programme targets as signs that the IMF remains the hand-
maiden of advanced economies’ (C. Jones, 2012).
What is left, then, of the Washington Consensus? Bail-out packages in
Europe show that standard demands about fiscal consolidation (through
spending cuts – mostly decreased pension and unemployment benefits)
and macro-structural reforms (labour market flexibility, deregulation and
competitionpolicy) still form the core of the prescriptive arsenal that comes
with IMF (or now European Union) loans: the IMF, after all, is a bank and
continues to see the fulfilment of such conditions as an essential tool to
protect the investment of its contributingmember-states.4 In that sense, the
Consensus may be very much alive where conditionality is still in place –
though it is unclear whether it is manufactured inWashington or Brussels.
But what about those places – like the BRIC countries – that have neither
desired nor required IMF intervention for some time now? The papers in
this issue (except Ferchen’s) suggest that the Consensus there may have
become more invisible than irrelevant. Realizing that there may be some
truth to the old joke about what the IMF acronym stands for (‘it’s mostly
fiscal’), countries now regard keeping their fiscal (and monetary) houses
in order as necessary conditions of domestic autonomy. In other words,
certain aspects of the Washington Consensus may have been naturalized
into policy common sense. In the last decade, the BRICs have all shared
a commitment to ‘macroeconomic prudence’ in the form of stable prices
and fiscal discipline (Babb, 2013: 19).5 Central bank independence has been
reinforced in India and Brazil.6 Instead of being imposed from the outside,
fiscal andmonetary rigour has thus been internalized: these commitments
now come largely from experts and politicians within. Rahul Mukherji’s
analysis of the post-1991 reforms in India, perhaps, makes the strongest
case that public officials underwent a genuine conversion. There is some
suggestion that similar dynamics are at work elsewhere, but this argument
cannot be generalized so easily: at least in the Brazilian and especially
the Russian case, it is difficult to disentangle the healthy macroeconomic
outlook from the windfall in resources fuelled by the commodity boom.
Furthermore, with a newly comfortable situation allowing themmore lee-
way, it is clear that officials, particularly in Brazil (Ban, 2013), have been
ready to depart significantly from fiscal and monetary self-restraint in an
effort to keep growth up.
Finally, strategies of growth in the BRICs have deviated even more ob-
viously fromWashington Consensus prescriptions. These strategies in the
BRIC countries have been varied, but they have accommodated a large
amount of state intervention or, at a minimum, significant political com-
promises that have weakened some of the boldest deregulatory efforts
(Mukherji, 2013). To be sure, themost extreme forms of import-substitution
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are gone and both Brazil and India now seek an export-led mode of inser-
tion into the global economy. As Cornel Ban (2013) argues, however, this
strategy in Brazil has relied on a consolidation of the state’s role as investor
and purveyor of credit to support the development of competitive advan-
tage in key sectors. Furthermore, far fromprivatizing social services, Brazil
has embarked on a massive programme of welfare state expansion, inno-
vative guaranteed income policies, education and training programmes,
and wage and employment policies. Russia deviates even more from the
Washington Consensus norm. Peter Rutland shows that central state con-
trol of the economy has increased significantly under Putin, asserting itself
against (or co-opting) the elites born from the reorganization of property
rights under Yeltsin. Finally, China offers an even more complicated case,
harbouring a host of competing regional and local models with seemingly
little coherence at the centre, and deep political conflicts over economic
ideas among the elite (Ferchen, 2013).
2. THE SYMBOLIC: HOW TO DO ECONOMIC THINGS
WITH WORDS
Ferchen (2013) points out that concepts only exist relationally, that is, rel-
ative to other discursive positions in a field: ‘The “Beijing Consensus”,’ he
argues, ‘is a concept that draws its power from its key position in a whole
system of interacting concepts.’ More specifically, the promotion of such a
notion byWestern commentators emerged as an attractive alternative pre-
cisely because the Washington Consensus had become so discredited by
political contention, real-world failures and the financial crisis in theWest.
Conceptualizing a ‘Beijing consensus’ was, in other words, a political act,
and thepolitics explains, in part,why the act caught on,why it generated so
much buzz as champions and critics gave it substantive meaning and nor-
mative force, touting it as amodel or as a foil. Also, the phrase ‘tapped into
the mix of excitement and anxiety inspired by China’s booming economy
and its rapidly expanding global economic and political influence’ (p9).
We may extend the argument to the ‘BRIC’ acronym. As with the
‘Beijing consensus’, its charisma – or ability to capture the imagination
of investors and policy makers around the world – comes in part from the
outsider status of its objects (Brazil-Russia-India-China) in relation to an
established discursive and political field. For BRICs were never defined
only positively, by the size of their economies and rapid economic growth,
over the last decade.What united these countries symbolically, whatmade
them look like a coherent, meaningful – if completely ad-hoc – group, was
also a communality of exclusion: there seemed to be no place for them in
the ideological frameworks and governance structures of the world econ-
omy. In fact, denouncing that exclusion and questioning the leadership
organization of the world economic order was a core purpose of the 2001
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Goldman Sachs paper that originated the BRICs acronym (O’Neill, 2001).
What good are world policymaking forums if they leave out close to a
quarter of the world economy?7 From this point of view, the G5 (US, UK,
France, Germany, Japan) and the G7 (the same, plus Canada and Italy)
were not only passe´, they were wrong. The G20 (more inclusive, more
democratic) is where the real action is.
Thus, what the term BRICs predicted, and what its promoters certainly
sought to engineer politically, was a power shift away from old Europe.
O’Neill’s forecast was clearly formulated in such oppositional terms: ‘If
the 2001/2002 outlook were to be repeated for the next 10 years, then by
2011 China will actually be as big as Germany on a current GDP basis,
and Brazil and India not far behind Italy’ (O’Neill, 2001: S.06). Further-
more, it is telling that right around the time that the uplifting acronym
of BRICs started catching on, fuelling a frenzy of investor optimism, the
Southern European countries, already nicknamed the ‘club [M]ed’ coun-
tries, found themselves stigmatized by the unpleasant acronym of PIGS
(Portugal-Italy-Greece-Spain).8 Thederogatory concept became sopopular
in trading rooms that bank leaders and newspaper editors had to formally
bar their staff from using it (Alloway, 2010). The moral–economic eleva-
tion of the larger periphery cannot be dissociated from the corresponding
downgrading of Southern Europe. As Figure 2 shows, the press interest
in the BRIC countries soared in 2010, with the outbreak of the Eurozone
crisis, which also offered a sharp contrast to the ebullience in the BRIC
countries’ securities markets (see Figure 3 for these data). Importantly, the
use of the stigmatizing terms of PIIGS (including Ireland) or ‘PIGS coun-
tries’ emerged during this period as well, though it was soon banned from
the pages of The Financial Times.
Whowould you rather put your money on – the BRICs or the PIGS? The
terms (which evocate, respectively, a sturdy material and a filthy porcine)
are not irrelevant here:we think and feel through language.Qualifiers such
as BRICS and PIGS, or even STUPID (Spain-Turkey-UK-Portugal-Italy-
Dubai)9 remind us that the economy is always and everywhere a morality
play,where actors – individuals, corporations, countries – are apprehended
not only through numbers, formulas and charts aiming at precision, but
also through rather coarse moral categories of virtue and vice, good and
bad, high and low (Fourcade, 2012). Language is performative, too. It elicits
positive and negative emotions, rallies up the excitement of investors or
chills their expectations, and creates identities, a point Ban aptly reminds
us of in his introduction. As Nigel Thrift (2001) pointed out about modern
American capitalism, it was ‘the romance, not the finance, that [made] the
business worth pursuing’. So much is at stake because language is never
‘just words’.
If language were just words, then the story of the BRICs would call
for us to marvel at the remarkable agreement between O’Neill’s early
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Figure 2 Mentions of BRICs and PIGS in The Financial Times vs. The Wall Street
Journal, 2001–12.Notes: The term, ‘BRIC countries’, was preferred to BRICs because
it is more conservative in pointing exactly to the information we are looking for
here. Patterns for BRICs were checked, however, and are similar. Search terms
used: ‘BRIC countries’ or BRICs [BRICs for short below]; ‘PIGS countries’ or PIIGS
[PIGS for short below]. Source: Nexis-Lexis (Financial Times), Proquest (Wall Street
Journal).
words and the world that came to be. A recent Financial Times blog post,
for instance, seeks to assess whether ‘Jim was right’. O’Neill’s prediction
was remarkably prescient, the article concludes, owing to the fact that he
picked his moment well: if the equities of Brazil, Russia, India and China
had languished in the 1990s, from about 2001 to 2010, they systematically
and largely outperformed the S&P500 (Figure 3).
Another read, however, will emphasize the embeddedness of the BRICs’
economic performance in the words (writ large) themselves. Put another
way, the ‘cultural circuit of capital’ (Thrift, 2001) – the stories we tell about
the economy, the categories we construct to account for it, even, to some
extent, the instruments we produce to measure it – is not just an epiphe-
nomenon floating above some real, underlyingmaterial structure: it stands
at the heart of the capitalist machine (Callon, 1998). BRICs must thus be
interpreted as an innovation in the ‘classifatory regime of international
finance’ – a political metaphor and narrative strategy that seeks to alter
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Figure 3 BRICs equities relative to S&P 500. Source: Rob Minto, 2011, ‘Chart of the
Week: Brics at 10’.The Financial Times, 29November,<blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics>
(accessed).
investment patterns in the emerging markets funds industry. (Wansleben,
2013). The very promotion of O’Neill’s research note by one of the most
important firms in the financial markets, precisely at the time when this
firmwas divesting its investments away from theWestern world, the even
more optimistic follow-up reports by that very same firm (in 2004 and
2007),10 the popularization of the concept by the Financial Times and the
Beyondbrics blog (inwhichO’Neill participates), the various creative plays
with the term to include other emerging economies and, in the end, the
emergence of cooperation among the BRICs themselves (the annual BRIC
summits) were part and parcel of the process of economic exuberance that
has channelled interest and capital toward these economies over the last
decade (and has fuelled their bubble-like growth). As Gillian Tett (2010)
has remarked, the BRIC concept caught on in part thanks to Goldman’s ex-
tensive executives’ network, who found in it ‘a snappy way of discussing
strategy. Better still, unlike phrases such as “emerging markets” or “de-
veloping world”, BRICs did not sound patronising, or unpromising; it
was neutral, strong, politically correct.’ But through these powerful relays,
some of which Goldman Sachs actively sought to control and some of
which escaped it, the firm’s power to categorize (and, therefore, institute
and qualify) reverberated throughout the economy. As Pierre Bourdieu
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(1977: 165) pointed out long ago, ‘the specifically symbolic power to im-
pose the principles of construction of reality – in particular, social reality –
is a major dimension of political power’.11 And, we might say, economic
power: BRICs-dedicated investment funds and products flourished, as
did consulting, branding and marketing activities, fuelling new sources of
profit for investment banks, consulting firms, credit rating agencies and
the financial press.12
And thus, perhaps, a follow-up issue will reflect upon the trajectory of
the BRIC countries in a different way, going beyond the question of what
these countries did for themselves – which this important symposium
focuses on – and asking, instead, what the concept did, or was meant to
do, for others.When the problem is posed in those terms, the BRICs appear
in a different light, responding to a different kind of external constraint:
the insatiable demands for excitement and profit that emanate from the
financial nebulae.
NOTES
1 ‘In broad terms, [the Washington consensus] recommends that governments
should reform their policies and, in particular: (a) pursue macroeconomic
stability by controlling inflation and reducing fiscal deficits; (b) open their
economies to the rest of the world through trade and capital account lib-
eralization; and (c) liberalize domestic product and factor markets through
privatization and deregulation’ (Gore, 2000: 789).
2 Also, Spanish governments could not be criticized for their lack of fiscal virtue
prior to the crisis, which was largely due to the bursting of a housing bubble.
3 It still is, but themuscle-flexing that preceded the election of Christine Lagarde,
a French lawyer and former French finance minister, to head the IMF in 2011
suggests that the timemaynot be far offwhenEuropeanswill lose this position.
4 The institution, however, may have grown more mindful about the political
effects of its own intrusiveness and stigmatizing stance. See, for instance, recent
efforts to set up pre-approved credit lines for countries, so they could call for
loans on their own terms.
5 Experience may be the most important reason for the newfound caution on
the fiscal front: except for China, all the BRICs were bruised by catastrophic
current account crises in the recent past, all of which called for drastic IMF
intervention (India in 1991, Russia in 1998 and Brazil in 1998 and 2002).
6 . . . to the dismay of critics such as Joseph Stiglitz, who argues that inflation
targeting is not an end in itself and that the independent central banks of the
United States and the Eurozone have hardly offered an example to follow.
7 As measured in PPP.
8 In 2008, the epithetwasmademore shrill-soundingwith the additionof another
I for Ireland – PIIGS.
9 STUPID was popularized by the blogger Zerohedge.
10 According to Goldman Sachs, China is now on track to overtake the United
States as the world’s largest economy in 2027.
11 Also see Bourdieu (1991) and Austin (1975).
12 The economic stakes of this symbolic exercise were well recognized by
Goldman Sachs’ competitors: Tett (2010) reports that ‘some banks tried to
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ban their employees from using the B word. “Why the hell should we do
Goldman’s marketing for it?” says the chief executive of one of the world’s
biggest investment banks.’
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